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Abstract 
Policymakers all over the world claim: no innovation without protection. For more than a century, 
critics have objected that the case for intellectual property is far from clear. This paper uses a game 
theoretic model to organise the debate. It is possible to model innovation as a prisoner's dilemma 
between potential innovators, and to interpret intellectual property as a tool for making cooperation 
the equilibrium. However, this model rests on assumptions about cost and benefit that are unlikely 
to hold, or have even been shown to be wrong, in many empirically relevant situations. Moreover, 
even if the problem is indeed a prisoner's dilemma, in many situations intellectual property is an 
inappropriate cure. It sets incentives to race to be the first, or the last, to innovate, as the case may 
be. In equilibrium, the firms would have to randomise between investment and non-investment, 
which is unlikely to work out in practice. Frequently, firms would have to invent cooperatively, 
which proves difficult in larger industries. 
Keywords: intellectual property, game theory 
JEL: C72, O31, K11 
                                        
*  Helpful comments by Stefan Bechtold, Dietmar Harhoff, Martin Hellwig and Stephan Lauermann, and the 
linguistic trimming of the paper by Darell Arnold are gratefully acknowledged.   2
1.  The Political Force of the Argument 
Words are a source of power. Successful policymakers are able to present regulatory intervention 
as the logical response to a publicly perceived problem. Intellectual property intensely intervenes 
into freedom and property. Those who have not been licensed are enjoined from using the idea. 
This even holds if they have lost a patent race, i.e. if the idea is their own. From the beginning, 
those in favour of intellectual property have brought forward an incentive argument: no innova-
tion without protection. It is to be found in the official documents of the US Patent and Trade-
mark Office 
“Growing global trade in pirated and counterfeit goods threatens America's innova-
tion economy, the competitiveness of our leading companies and small manufactur-
ers, and the livelihoods of their workers.”
1 
EU directives follow suit: 
“If authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have to 
receive an appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must producers in order to 
be able to finance this work. […] Adequate legal protection of intellectual property 
rights is necessary in order to guarantee the availability of such a reward and provide 
the opportunity for satisfactory returns on this investment.“
2 
The theoretical, empirical and political debate on the issue dates back to the 19
th century 
(Machlup and Penrose 1950; Hadfield 1992). Entire libraries have been written on the topic. Ex-
cellent surveys are available (Machlup 1958; Towse and Holzhauer 2002; Federal Trade Com-
mission 2003; Scotchmer 2004; Menell and Scotchmer 2005). This paper does not intend to add 
to this literature. It does not try to be comprehensive. All it sets out to do is this: it uses a simple 
game theoretic model to present the key arguments from this discussion in a consistent form. 
Section 2 tells a coherent story of why intellectual property is indeed necessary to bring about 
innovation. Section 3 shows how this argument rests on assumptions about the nature of the 
problem that are not likely to be true in many plausible situations. Section 4 demonstrates that 
there are important situations where intellectual property is not necessary for innovation, or 
where it is even counterproductive, even if one believes in the underlying definition of the prob-
lem. Section 5 drops two assumptions inherent in the original model. The demand side is explic-
itly modelled. And the possibility is introduced that two firms simultaneously invest, but ulti-
mately only one of them gets the property right. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The Incentive Story 
It is possible to conceptualise the problem of innovation in a way (subsection 2.1) that makes 
intellectual property the natural solution (subsection 2.2). 
                                        
1   http://www.uspto.gov/main/profiles/stopfakes.htm. 
2   Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, al. 10.   3
2.1  A Model of the Innovation Problem 
In essence, innovation is about ideas. To generate new ideas, resources must be invested. For 
most innovations, human capital—i.e. researchers—is not enough. They must also receive tech-
nical and administrative support; they need a laboratory and a library; they must travel to meet 
their peers; the feasibility of their ideas must be tested in real-life settings. Researchers them-
selves may often well be intrinsically motivated, so that (financial) incentives are not necessary, 
and they may even be counterproductive (Frey 1997). However, for the professional environ-
ment, intrinsic motivation is much less likely to work. 
The fact that financial resources are needed does not in and of itself cause a problem. If nobody 
else is interested in the idea, the resources are correctly allocated. The resources invested depend 
on the willingness to pay of those working on the idea. However, most ideas are of interest to 
outsiders. Competitors are also able to reduce their production costs if they exploit a process in-
novation. Competitors and the demand side of the market increase their utility if they rely on an 
idea that led to a product innovation. In order to make the presentation of the argument more 
transparent, the demand side is neglected at this point. It is considered in Section 5. 
If outsiders have an interest in the idea, innovation has a positive externality. It is due to the fact 
that ideas are pure public goods. Once the idea is publicly available, nobody can be prevented 
from exploiting it. If one person relies on the idea, this does not make the idea less valuable. Nei-
ther exclusion nor rivalry in consumption is present. Public goods theory predicts that such 
goods will not be provided in the socially desirable quantity. If the individual benefit is below 
the cost, the good will not be provided at all (Cornes and Sandler 1996).  
This prediction is based on a game theoretic model. The relationship between the innovator and 
all outsiders is conceptualised as a prisoner's dilemma (for a similar, but less comprehensive ap-
proach, see Gordon 1992). As long as those interested in the innovation stand no chance of form-
ing coalitions, a two-person model suffices. It describes the interaction between the potential 
innovator and every single person interested in the innovation. 
In this model, there are four situations: I invest, but my interaction partner does not. Denoting 
investment as cooperation C, and non-investment as defection D, this situation may be written as 
CD. By the same token, the situation where my interaction partner invests, but I do not, is de-
noted as DC. In situation CC, we both invest. In situation DD, neither of us does. Note that, in 
the baseline model, if we both invest, this means there is cooperative research. This assumption 
is dropped in Section 5.  
Since we are in a situation of strategic interaction, my payoff not only depends on what I do, but 
also on what my interaction partner does. The model assumes that we take these decisions simul-
taneously. There is thus no planning meeting where we write a joint production plan. Alterna-
tively, one may interpret the model as saying that, absent intervention from the legal order, 
promises made at such planning meetings would not be credible (Heckathorn 1989). Given these   4
assumptions, payoffs may be defined as in Table 1. Since the game is fully symmetric, it suffices 
to define payoffs for one of the agents. 
 benefit  cost  payoff  rank 
DC  b 0 b 3 
CC b  -c b-c  2 
DD  0 0 0 1 
CD b  -2c  b-2c 0 
 
Table 1 
Baseline Model: Payoffs 
 
The game is a prisoner's dilemma if payoffs are indeed ranked as in Table 1. This is the case if 
the following holds: 
DC > CC: b>b-c, which is true if c>0 
CC > DD: b-c>0, which is true if c<b 
DD > CD: 0>b-2c, which is true if b<2c 






(Rapoport and Chammah 1965), which is true since 
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If parameters are specified as indicated, this constitutes the game as in Table 2. In this table, 
payoffs are represented by their ranks to make it easier to see the strategic implications. 
 C  D 
C 2,2  0,3 





Excluding dominated strategies, or looking for the Nash equilibrium, one finds the only equilib-
rium in the DD cell. In equilibrium, neither firm invests in innovation. This is a dilemma since, 
by investing, both firms would be individually better off. Strategic interaction prevents them 
from getting at the Pareto superior solution. This is due to a combination of greed and fear. 
Greedy firms prefer their individually best outcome (in the DC cell) over their individually sec-
ond-best outcome (in the CC cell). Fearful firms preempt this by themselves defecting (Macy 
and Flache 2002).   5
2.2  Intellectual Property As the Solution 
If the legal order grants the inventor a property right, outsiders are no longer able to exploit the 
idea, unless the inventor allows them to do so. The property right thus allocates bargaining 
power. The innovator is able to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The strategy space of the firms is 
extended to giving or buying licences. This is denoted the following way: as before, either firm 
may invest (I), or not (I). If only one firm invests, the other may decide to buy a licence (L) or 
not (L). This makes for payoffs as in Table 3. 
 benefit  cost  licence  payoff  rank3 
IIL b  -2c  L  b-2c+l  4 
II b  -c  0  b-c  3 
IIL b  0  -i  b-l  2 
II 0  0  0  0  1 
IIL 0  0  0  0  1 
IIL b  -2c  0  b-2c  0 
 
Table 3 
Impact of Property Right on Payoffs 
 
The ranking as in this table presupposes  
IIL > II: b-2c+l>b-c = l>c 
II > IIL: b-c>b-l = l>c 
IIL > II: b-l>0 = b>l 
IIL > IIL: 0>b-2c = 2c>b 
The assumption that 2c>b was already present in the original model. l>c implies that buying a 
licence is more expensive than contributing to cooperative innovation. b>l implies that outsiders 
want to buy a licence from the innovator. 
In this model,
4 trading a licence is an option only if one firm has innovated and the other has not. 
Consequently, the firms no longer play a simultaneous game. When deciding whether to buy a 
licence, firm 2 knows whether firm 1’s innovative efforts have been successful. Figure 1 has the 





                                        
3   In the baseline model, ranks would also do for the extended model. In later sections, however, equilibria in 
mixed strategies play a role. Calculating the equilibrium probabilities, one needs absolute, not only relative 
payoffs. This is why, in the extended model, ranks are no longer presented. 














Game Structure with Intellectual Property 
 
By backwards induction, one finds that, at the ultimate node, firm 1 prefers to sell (left branch) 
or to buy a licence (right branch). Selling a licence is preferable since b-2c+l>b-2c. Buying a 
licence is preferable since it has been assumed that b-l>0. Given these decisions of firm 1, in 
both branches, firm 2 prefers to invest. In the left branch, this is due to the fact that it has been 
assumed that l>c, and consequently b-c>b-l. In the right branch, this is due to the fact that b-
2c+l>0, again from the assumptions. Since not investing is dominated for firm 2, at the origin of 
the game, firm 1 can anticipate firm 2’s move. Knowing that firm 2 will always invest, firm 1 
compares b-c in the left with b-l in the right branch. Due to the assumption l>c, it prefers to in-
vest. 
If the assumptions about the structure of the game and about the payoffs are correct, intellectual 
property thus indeed dissolves the dilemma. Anticipating that they would be worse off if only the 
other firm invests and they have to buy a licence, both firms invest from the outset. That way, 
they attain the individually and socially best outcome. 
3.  Qualifying the Model of the Innovation Problem 
In the baseline model, intellectual property is socially beneficial since the innovation problem is 
modelled as a prisoner's dilemma. This need not be the case. The game changes if the inventor 
has a larger individual benefit, or a smaller cost (subsection 3.1); if outsiders have less benefit or   7
more cost (subsection 3.2); and if cooperative invention is more costly (subsection 3.3). All of 
this is empirically plausible, at least in discernible parts of the economy. 
3.1  The Position of the Inventor 
In the baseline model, the inventor and outsiders have identical costs and benefits. In entrepre-
neurial reality, this is often not the case. Firms engage in innovation if they expect a particularly 
high benefit. Their production is already organised such that the production cost plummets if 
process innovation is successful. Their customer base is particularly receptive to some product 
innovation. They dispose of a research and development department that is likely to be success-
ful with little time and effort, meaning that the expected cost of innovation is small. 
Within the model, this changes the payoff in case I invest, and the others do not. In the baseline 
model, this payoff was b-2c. It now becomes b-2c+ε. The game remains a prisoner's dilemma as 
long as b-2c+ε<0 or ε<2c-b. If ε is in the interval c>ε>2c-b, the preference order for both firms 
changes to 
DC > CC > CD > DD 
This constitutes a battle of the sexes. In ranking notation, it is diagrammed as in Table 4. 
 C  D 
C 2,2  1,3 
D 3,1 0,0 
 
Table 4 
Small Additional Benefit for the Inventor 
 
There is still a social problem, but it is reduced to equilibrium selection (cf. Guesnerie 2001). 
The game has three equilibria. In the two equilibria in pure strategies, one firm invests, and the 
other does not. The investing firm gets its third-best outcome. The non-investing firm gets its 























At the borderline, i.e. if ε=2c-b, this payoff is 0. Consequently, whenever ε>2c-b, the symmetric 
payoff is strictly larger than 0, and hence larger than the payoff both expect if they defect. How-
ever, mixed strategies are not easy to implement. A practically more relevant solution consists of 
moving from simultaneous to sequential interaction. By her own move, the first mover deter-  8
mines the equilibrium. In practice, this will often not be difficult to bring about. It suffices if one 
firm is able to credibly commit to a strategy. However, in this game, the first mover wants to 
induce the other firm to invest. It must therefore credibly commit to not investing. One option is 
sinking cost in an advertising campaign for the current product. 
The game remains a battle of the sexes if the advantage of the investing firm, compared to the 
baseline model, is even larger. If 2c>ε>c, the preference order changes to 
DC > CD > CC > DD 
This constitutes the following game: 
 C  D 
C 1,1  2,3 
D 3,2 0,0 
 
Table 5 
Larger Benefit for the Innovator 
 
The two equilibria in pure strategies remain the same. Each firm still prefers the equilibrium in 
which it does not invest. In the equilibrium in mixed strategies, the probability of investing is 
still calculated the same way. Inserting the lower bound, i.e. ε=c, into the equation for calculating 
xb, one finds that the payoff from playing mixed strategies is strictly larger than b-c. In the 
symmetric equilibrium, the two firms may therefore be sure to be strictly better off than if both 
of them invest. 
Finally, if ε>2c, preferences change to 
CD > DC > CC > DD 
This constitutes the following battle of the sexes: 
 C  D 
C 1,1  3,2 
D 2,3 0,0 
 
Table 6 
Very Large Benefit for the Innovator 
 
If they play one of the equilibria in pure strategies, now each firm wants to invest. In this case, 
the shift to a sequential game is even easier to bring about. It suffices for a firm to ostensibly 
engage in research and development. In this case, the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium 
does not admit such a straightforward interpretation. At the borderline, i.e. when ε=2c, the payoff 
is 
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3.2  The Position of Outsiders 
In the baseline model, outsiders are able to appropriate foreign innovation at zero cost. In entre-
preneurial reality, this is rare (Levin, Klevorick et al. 1987). Normally, imitation comes at a posi-





from (Mansfield, Schwartz et al. 1981:908) 
 
This study includes patented innovations. However, in the median, a patent has increased the 
imitation cost by only 11% (Mansfield, Schwartz et al. 1981:913). The findings from this study 
are thus also relevant in the situation investigated here, i.e. in the absence of intellectual property 
rights.   10
Within the model, positive imitation cost means that, in the DC cell, a firm only expects b-ε. As 
the study demonstrates, the cost of imitation may even be larger than the cost of invention. In 
that case, ε>2c. This generates the game in Table 8. 
 C  D 
C 3,3 1,0 
D 0,1  2,2 
 
Table 8 
Very High Imitation Cost 
 
The game is a stag hunt. There is again a problem of equilibrium selection. It is solved if the 
firms can switch to sequential play. Since both firms are best off if both invest, this should not be 
difficult in practice. It suffices if one firm credibly commits to investing. Since both equilibria in 
pure strategies are symmetric, the third equilibrium in mixed strategies is of lesser interest. It 



















Since already b-2c<0, the denominator, and hence the term, are negative—and the larger ε, the 
more negative they are. In the mixed equilibrium, the firms thus have strictly less than in the 
worse of the equilibria in pure strategies. 
In the next interval, imitation is less costly than invention. But the cost of imitation still is above 
the benefit. In this interval, 2c>ε>b. This makes for preferences 
CC > DD > DC > CD 
The resulting game still is a stag hunt. 
 C  D 
C 3,3 0,1 
D 1,0  2,2 
 
Table 9 
Imitation Cost Above Benefit 
 
The two equilibria in pure strategies are the same as before. In the mixed equilibrium, at the up-
per bound, i.e. with ε=b, both firms expect a payoff of 0. Since, in this interval, ε is strictly larger 
than b, the payoff is always negative. In the mixed equilibrium, the firms thus still expect strictly 
less than in the worse of the two equilibria in pure strategies.   11
In the third interval, the cost of imitation is smaller than the benefit, but larger than the cost of 
cooperative invention. In this interval, b>ε>c. This changes the ranking of outcomes to 
CC > DC > DD > CD 
and generates the following game: 
 C  D 
C 3,3 2 ,0 
D 0,2 1,1 
 
Table 10 
Imitation Cost above Cost of Cooperative Invention 
 
This game has a single equilibrium in pure strategies. In this equilibrium, both firms invest right 
from the beginning. 
The strategic implications are the same if imitation is less beneficial than invention. Formally, it 
does not matter whether –ε results from the fact that imitation has a cost, or that it yields a 
smaller benefit. Empirically, the effect is plausible since imitation typically takes time. Table 11 




from (Mansfield, Schwartz et al. 1981:909) 
   12
In the meantime, the successor makes no additional profit. Often, she even incurs a loss. It is 
most pronounced if the innovation reduces the cost for producing a homogenous product, if mar-
ginal cost is constant and if the capacity of the innovator is not limited. In that case, the innova-
tor will reduce her price slightly below the production cost of the incumbent. This will reduce 
demand for the incumbent’s product to zero. Until the incumbent catches up, she makes zero 
profit. If there is a fixed cost, she incurs a loss (Bertrand 1883; Kreps and Scheinkman 1983).  
3.3  The Cost of Cooperative Invention 
Finally, the cost of cooperative invention will often be above the cost of individual invention. 
This may be due to economies of scale and scope, learning effects or x-inefficiencies, to list only 
the most important factors. Within the model, this means that the payoff in the CC cell goes 
down to b-c-ε. This has no effect on the equilibrium as long as the cost of cooperative invention 
is smaller than the individual benefit, i.e. as long as b-c-ε>0 or ε<b-c. In the next interval, the 
cost of cooperative invention is above benefit, but below the cost of individual invention. In this 
interval, c>ε>b-c. This changes preferences to 
DC > DD > CC > CD 
and generates the following game: 
 C  D 
C 1,1  0,3 
D 3,0 2,2 
 
Table 12 
Cooperative Invention Prohibitively Costly 
 
The equilibrium is the same as in the original prisoner's dilemma. Neither firm invests. However, 
this is no longer a dilemma. Both firms would be worse off investing, even if the other firm also 
did. 
The structure of the game, and the equilibrium, remain the same if the cost of cooperative inven-
tion is even higher, i.e. if ε>c. In that case, preferences are 
DC > DD > CD > CC 
which makes for the following game: 
 C D 
C 0,0 1,3 
D 3,1 2,2 
 
Table 13 
Cooperative Invention More Costly Than Individual Invention   13
4.  Qualifying the Effect of Intellectual Property 
The previous section has shown that there are manifold, empirically plausible situations where 
the interaction between several firms interested in an innovation is not well captured by a pris-
oner's dilemma. But even if the prisoner's dilemma is an appropriate model of the innovation 
problem, intellectual property is not always the desirable solution. Many plausible changes to the 
model do, however, not change the equilibrium. Provided there is a prisoner's dilemma, intellec-
tual property thus is a fairly robust institution. There are, however, a number of empirically rele-
vant changes that make intellectual property a problematic intervention. 
Three situations are worth investigating. In reality, licensees often suffer a bigger disadvantage 
(subsection 4.1). Even if cooperative invention has not been so detrimental as to change the 
original problem, its drawbacks can still have an undesirable impact on the effects of intellectual 
property (subsection 4.2). Finally, in commercial practice, intellectual property often only grants 
partial protection. It makes imitation more costly, but not impossible (subsection 4.3). 
4.1  Drawbacks for Licensees  
In the baseline model, the benefit from invention is the same for both firms. In practice, this is 
often not true. The inventor only grants licences after she has built a stable customer base. The 
licence comes with terms and conditions that make it impossible to exploit the full benefits from 
the invention. Within the model, this means that the payoff for IIL decreases to b-l-ε. As will be 
shown, this changes the reasoning quite profoundly. But in equilibrium, both firms still invest 
right from the beginning. With this change, the game tree can be modelled as in Figure 2. 














Drawbacks for Licensees 
 
The equilibrium and the reasoning remain the same as long as b-l-ε>0 or ε<b-l. If ε>b-l, in the 
last node of the right branch, firm 1 no longer wants to buy a licence. Consequently, since b-
2c<0, in the right branch, firm 2 no longer wants to invest. To find the equilibrium, the game is 
best represented in normal form. 
 I  I 
IL b-c,b-c  b-2c+l,b-l-ε 
IL b-c,b-c  b-2c,0 
IL b-l-ε,b-2c+l 0,0 
IL 0,b-2c  0,0 
 
Table 14 
Drawbacks for Licensees, Normal Form 
 
The solution is found by iterated dominance. IL dominates IL, since b-c>0 and b-2c+l>0. IL 
dominates IL even more, since b-l-ε<0. In the remaining cells, I dominates I, since b-c>0>b-l-ε. 
In the only equilibrium, both firms invest.   15
4.2  Disadvantages of Cooperative Invention 
As has been shown above, the problem does not change as long as cooperative invention is only 
mildly more costly, or less advantageous, than in the baseline model. It remains a prisoner's di-
lemma as long as b-c-ε>0. However, the effect of intellectual property becomes uncertain as 
soon as ε>l-c. In the interval b-c>ε>l-c, the game can be represented as follows: 
 I  I 
IL b-c-ε,b-c-ε b-2c+l,b-l 
IL b-c-ε,b-c-ε b-2c,0 
IL b-l,b-2c+l 0,0 
IL 0,b-2c  0,0 
 
Table 15 
Costly Cooperative Invention in the Prisoner's Dilemma 
 
Domination reduces the game. IL is dominated by IL, since b-c-ε>0 and b-2c+l>0. IL is (weakly) 
dominated by IL, since b-2c+l>b-2c. The remaining game is a battle of the sexes. If firm 1 plays 
IL, firm 2 prefers I, since b-l>b-c-ε implies ε>l-c, as assumed. If firm 1 plays IL, firm 2 prefers I, 
since b-2c+l>0. Likewise, firm 1 prefers IL if firm 2 plays I, since b-l>b-c-ε. And firm 1 prefers 
IL if firm 2 plays I, since b-2c+l>0. 
Despite legal intervention the game thus has multiple equilibria. In the two equilibria in pure 
strategies, one of the firms invests. The other buys a licence. The investing firm makes a larger 
profit. The legal intervention thus creates an incentive to preempt foreign investment. The win-
ner may invest the difference between both payoffs, minus a marginal amount η, and still make a 
positive profit. Formally, she may at most invest b-2c+l-(b-l)-η=2l-2c-η. Note that this is not a 
patent race,
5 but a race to credibly commit to an investment strategy. 

















) (  
Evaluating this at the lower bound, i.e. at ε=l-c, yields b-l. If they play the mixed equilibrium, 
each party may therefore be sure to make a higher profit than in the more disfavourable of the 
two equilibria in pure strategies. Moreover, in the mixed equilibrium, payoffs are the same for 
both firms. The mixed equilibrium is therefore more equitable. It is, however, difficult to bring 
about in competitive practice. 
                                        
5   On patent races, see below, Section 5.   16
4.3  Patents as Attenuated Property Rights 
Imitation not only matters for the definition of the innovation problem. It also changes the effects 
of intellectual property rights, once they are introduced. Typically, patents do not make imitation 
impossible, but only more expensive (Mansfield, Schwartz et al. 1981; Lemley and Shapiro 
2005). Table 16 shows how small the influence of patents on imitation cost typically is. 
 
Table 16 
Impact of Patent on Imitation Cost 
from (Levin, Klevorick et al. 1987:809) 
 
Patents are therefore fairly attenuated property rights (Eggertsson 1990). 
Within the model, this means that the benefit of outsiders who have not bought a licence is ε>0. 
This makes for the game represented in Table 17. It has an equilibrium different from the base-
line game, provided ε>b-c. 
 
 
   17
 I  I 
IL b-c,b-c b-2c+l,b-l 
IL b-c,b-c  b-2c,ε 
IL b-l,b-2c+l  0,0 
IL  ε,b-2c 0,0 
 
Table 17 
Attenuated Property Rights 
 
Domination simplifies the game. IL dominates IL, since b-c>b-l, and b-2c+l>0, both on the basis 
of the original assumptions. IL also (weakly) dominates IL, since b-2c+l>b-2c. The remaining 
game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. If firm 1 plays IL, firm 2 prefers I, since l>c. If firm 
1 plays IL, firm 2 prefers I, since 0>b-2c. If firm 2 plays I, firm 1 prefers IL, since ε>b-c. And if 
firm 2 plays I, firm 1 prefers IL, since b-2c+l>0.  




























At the borderline, i.e. if ε=b-c, this simplifies to b-c. Consequently, firm 1 expects somewhat 









Note that firm 2’s payoff does not depend on ε. It is positive, since all three terms are >0. But it 
is strictly smaller than firm 1’s payoff. To see this, solve the following equation for θ , the dif-
ference between the two payoffs at the lowest possible value of ε: 

















This is bound to be negative. The numerator is positive, since l>c. The denominator is positive, 
since c+l>b. Consequently θ<0.  
This is a terse environment for innovation. It is highly likely that the firms will miss the equilib-
rium altogether. A mixed equilibrium is difficult to implement anyhow. The problem is aggra-
vated here, since both firms must choose different probabilities, and since either firm must be-  18
lieve the other to exactly play the equilibrium probabilities. More importantly even, the firms do 
not expect the same payoffs. Now in reality, the roles of firm 1 and firm 2 are not predefined. 
Therefore a race to be firm 1 should take place. Such a race is, however, more difficult to man-
age than when cooperative invention is more costly. Here, the firm would have to credibly com-
mit to investing, with a well defined probability. The situation is much more likely to end in 
chaos. 
5. Robustness 
How robust is the argument thus developed? Two changes to the baseline model are worth con-
sidering. One may explicitly introduce the demand side (subsection 5.1), and one may allow for 
a patent race (subsection 5.2). 
5.1  Introducing the Demand Side into the Baseline Model 
In the baseline model, the demand side of the market is represented indirectly. Competition pre-
vents buyers from paying excessive prices, and competition ensures that buyers get the products 
that are closest to their preferences. For most industries, the indirect representation does not omit 
important elements of the problem. Of course, buyers must have a positive willingness to pay. 
Otherwise producers would not have an incentive to engage in innovation. However in most in-
dustries, even absent intellectual property, buyers stand no chance of appropriating the idea. For 
them, the idea as such is useless. They lack the ability to transform the idea into a product.  
Occasionally, this is different. Electronic documents and computer programmes are the most 
important exceptions. Everybody can copy them at almost no cost and effort. Another case in 
point is demand by downstream industries. They sometimes have enough know-how and re-
sources to manufacture semifinished parts themselves once they have seen the idea. In principle, 
neither of these calls for a different model. As long as coalitions are excluded, the two-person 
model also captures interaction in large populations. However the larger the population, the more 
difficult cooperative invention is to manage. In such settings, intellectual property may be justi-
fied as a tool for reducing transaction costs. 
A radically different modelling strategy would only look at the interaction between one producer 
and a community of potential buyers. Such a model would thus ignore competition between pro-
ducers. In order to be meaningful, it must assume that buyers possess the ability to appropriate 
the idea. This leads to a less informative model. Since there is no other potential inventor, for the 
single producer, defection does not make sense. Nor is it possible for a buyer to contribute in any 
other way than by buying the product. For buyers there is thus no meaningful CD option. It col-
lapses with the DD option. The benefit the single producer can expect from selling the product 
must suffice to cover the cost of innovation. b-c>0 must therefore hold. The benefit for producers   19
is the aggregate payment of buyers. The consumer rent is denoted as r. This makes for the fol-
lowing payoffs and hence preferences: 
 benefit  cost  payoff  rank 
DC  0 0 0 1 
CC b  -c b-c 2 
DD  0 0 0 1 
CD 0  -c -c  0 
 
Table 18 
Single Producer’s Preferences 
 
 benefit  cost  payoff  rank 
DC  b+r 0 b+r 2 
CC b+r  -b  r  1 
DD  0 0 0 0 





This constitutes the following game: 
   buyers 
   C  D 
C 2,1 0,2  seller 
D 1,0 1 ,0 
 
Table 20 
Game between Buyers and a Single Seller 
 
This is still a dilemma. Without legal intervention, the seller will not invest; buyers will not con-
tribute to the cost of invention. Both would be better off if the seller invested and the buyers 
paid. Consequently, in the alternative modelling strategy, the model loses richness, but the stra-
tegic implications remain the same. 
5.2 Patent  Races 
In the baseline model, there are races for invention. But these races result from attempts to force 
the competitor into a less favourable equilibrium, not from the exclusive character of patent pro-
tection. Actually, patent races are excluded from the baseline model by the assumption that li-
cences are only bought by firms that have not invested. Since patent races are frequent in prac-
tice, and are a popular topic in theory (Loury 1979; Lee and Wilde 1980; Reinganum 1981; Har-
ris and Vickers 1985), it is worth extending the model. In extensive form, the extended model 
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The extension is in the outer left branch. If both firms have decided to invest, firm 1 may choose 
between cooperative and competitive innovation. If firm 1 opts for competition, Nature decides 
which of the two firms is first successful, and hence protected by the patent. In the last node, 
firm 2 chooses between buying or selling a licence, on the one hand, and not trading a licence, on 
the other hand. In all four cases, both firms have invested, which is why payoffs are always re-
duced by -2c.  
The game is solved by backwards induction. If firm 2 has been successful, she prefers selling a 
licence, since b-2c+l>b-2c. Firm 2 also prefers to buy a licence if she has lost the patent race. For 
b-2c-l>-2c, or b-l>0, on the basis of the original assumptions. Note that, in this case, firm 2 
chooses between two negative payoffs. Firm 1’s choice between competition and cooperation 
depends on Nature's move. Firm 1 competes if 
c b l c b z l c b z − > − − − + + − ) 2 )( 1 ( ) 2 (  
where z is the probability that firm 1 will win the patent race. Solving for z, one finds the mini-







In reality, it is quite likely that both firms will not estimate their individual probability of success 
the same way. Overoptimism is a fairly robust phenomenon (see only van den Steen 2004). As a 
result, the firms will engage in a patent race although, in the fully informed equilibrium, they   21
would cooperate. In the following, this additional complication is assumed away. It thus is as-
sumed that both firms believe in the same value of z, and that they believe that the other believes 
that they believe this. 
If they both believe that z is above the critical value, firm 1 expects b-c+η, where η is a markup. 
Consequently, in the outer left branch, firm 1 competes. In the left branch, firm 2 therefore in-
vests if 
l b l c b z l c b z − > + − − + − − ) 2 )( 1 ( ) 2 ( 
Inserting the threshold value of z, the left-hand side becomes b-3c, which is strictly less than the 
right-hand side. Consequently, in the left branch, firm 2 does not invest. However, for the same 
reasons as in the baseline model, in the right branch, firm 2 invests. To find the equilibrium, the 
game is best represented in normal form. 
 IL  IL I L IL 
ICompL  b-c+η,b-3c-η  b/2l(c+l)-2c+η, 
b-2c-b/2l(c+l)-η  b-2c+l,b-l b-2c+l,b-l 
ICompL  b-c+η,b-3c-η  b/2l(c+l)-2c+η, 
b-2c-b/2l(c+l)-η  b-2c,0 b-2c,0 
ICoopL  b-c,b-c b-c,b-c  b-2c+l,b-l b-2c+l,b-l 
ICoopL  b-c,b-c b-c,b-c b-2c,0  b-2c,0 
IL  b-l,b-2c+l b-l,b-2c+l  0,0  0,0 
IL  0,b-2c 0,b-2c  0,0  0,0 
 
Table 21 
Patent Race, Normal Form 
 
In this matrix, “Comp” means that firm 1 engages in a patent race, while “Coop” means that it 
does not. Note that L and L mean different things to the two players. In the rows, these two let-
ters stand for firm 1’s decision in the third node of the game. In the columns, the two letters 
stand for firm 2’s choice in the last node of the left branch. 
The game is solved by iterated dominance. ICoopL dominates IL. b-c>0 and b-2c+l>0, both on 
the basis of the assumptions of the baseline game. ICoopL also dominates IL. b-c>b-l, or l>0, 
and again b-2c+l>0. ICoopL further (weakly) dominates ICoopL. b-2c+l>b-2c, or l>0. ICompL 
(weakly) dominates ICompL, again since b-2c+l>b-2c. In the remaining game, for player 2, IL 
(weakly) dominates IL. To see this, solve  
η θ η − + − − = + − − ) (
2
2 3 l c
l
b
c b c b  






c + − = θ  
If  0 < θ , this means that IL is dominated. θ  is negative if the second term is larger than c. On 




. This is bound to be larger than c, given b>l. Consequently,  0 < θ  holds.   22
In the remaining game, ICompL (weakly) dominates ICoopL, since b+c+η>b+c. Finally, IL and 
IL (which are identical when coupled with ICompL) dominate IL, since b-l>b-3c-η. This deter-
mines the equilibrium. It depends on the value of z, i.e. on the degree of asymmetry between the 







the firm that is more likely to be successful invests. The other buys a licence (this coincides with 
the result of Harris and Vickers 1985). If the asymmetry is less pronounced, both firms innovate 
cooperatively. In neither case is there an actual patent race. 
6. Conclusions 
Is intellectual property a necessary condition for innovation? It depends. In many plausible situa-
tions, there is no dilemma in the first place, calling for legal intervention. In many of these situa-
tions, there is at most a problem of equilibrium selection. In some, there is no social problem at 
all. Empirical research on innovation across industries makes it likely that policymakers will be 
able to discern many of these situations (Mansfield 1986; Burk and Lemley 2003; Federal Trade 
Commission 2003:chapter 3), allowing them to design industry-specific rules. 
Moreover, intellectual property frequently is problematic even if the underlying problem is in-
deed a (prisoner’s) dilemma. The legal intervention may trigger a wasteful race to be the first, or 
the last, to innovate, as the case may be. In a significant number of cases, the participating firms 
would have to randomise between investing and not investing, with well-defined probabilities. 
This is hard to implement in entrepreneurial practice. In equilibrium, frequently all of the parties 
have to invent cooperatively. This is difficult to do, and becomes increasingly so, the larger the 
number of those competing. For all of these reasons, policymakers are well advised to take alter-
native institutional arrangements seriously, like open-source invention.   23
Literature 
BERTRAND, JOSEPH LOUIS FRANCOIS (1883). "Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale par 
León Walras. Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses par 
Augustin Cournot." Journal des savants 67: 499-508. 
BURK, DAN L. and MARK A. LEMLEY (2003). "Policy Levers in Patent Law." Virginia Law Re-
view 89: 1575-1696. 
CORNES, RICHARD and TODD SANDLER (1996). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and 
Club Goods. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
EGGERTSSON, THRAINN (1990). Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge England; New 
York, Cambridge University Press. 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2003). To Promote Innovation 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
FREY, BRUNO (1997). Not Just for the Money. An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. 
Cheltenham, Elgar. 
GORDON, WENDY J. (1992). "Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual 
Property." University of Dayton Law Review 17: 853-869. 
GUESNERIE, ROGER (2001). "The Government and Market Expectations." Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics 157: 116-126. 
HADFIELD, GILLIAN (1992). "The Economics of Copyright. An Historical Perspective." Copy-
right Law Symposium 38: 1-46. 
HARRIS, CHRISTOPHER and JOHN VICKERS (1985). "Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race." 
Review of Economic Studies 52: 193-209. 
HECKATHORN, DOUGLAS D. (1989). "Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Prob-
lem." Rationality and Society 1: 78-100. 
KREPS, DAVID M. and JOSE ALEXANDRE SCHEINKMAN (1983). "Quantity Precommitment and 
Bertrand Competition Yields Cournot Outcomes." Bell Journal of Economics 14: 326-337. 
LEE, TOM and LOUIS L. WILDE (1980). "Market Structure and Innovation. A Reformulation." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 94: 429-436. 
LEMLEY, MARK A. and CARL SHAPIRO (2005). "Probabilistic Patents." Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 19: 75-98.   24
LEVIN, RICHARD C., ALVIN K. KLEVORICK, RICHARD R. NELSON, SIDNEY G. WINTER, RICHARD 
GILBERT and ZVI GRILICHES (1987). "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research 
and Development." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 783-831. 
LOURY, GLEN C. (1979). "Market Structure and Innovation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 93: 
395-410. 
MACHLUP, FRITZ (1958). An Economic Review of the Patent System. Washington. 
MACHLUP, FRITZ and EDITH PENROSE (1950). "The Patent Controvery in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury." Journal of Economic History 10: 8-36. 
MACY, MICHAEL M. and ANDREAS FLACHE (2002). "Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas." 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 99: 
7229-7236. 
MANSFIELD, EDWIN (1986). "Patents and Innovation. An Empirical Study." Management Science 
32: 173-181. 
MANSFIELD, EDWIN, MARK SCHWARTZ and SAMUEL WAGNER (1981). "Imitation Costs and Pat-
ents. An Empirical Study." Economic Journal 91: 907-918. 
MENELL, PETER S. and SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, Eds. (2005). Intellectual Property. 
RAPOPORT, ANATOL and ALBERT M. CHAMMAH (1965). Prisoner's Dilemma. A Study in Conflict 
and Cooperation. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. 
REINGANUM, JENNIFER (1981). "Dynamic Games of Innovation." Journal of Economic Theory 
25: 21-41. 
SCOTCHMER, SUZANNE (2004). Innovation and Incentives. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
TOWSE, RUTH and RUDI HOLZHAUER, Eds. (2002). The Economics of Intellectual Property. The 
international library of critical writings in economics ; 145. Cheltenham, Elgar. 
VAN DEN STEEN, ERIC (2004). "Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases)." American Economic 
Review 94: 1141-1151. 
 
 
   25
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
 
Preprints 2007 
156.  Denise Bauer, Die Gesellschaft Bürgerlichen Rechts als Corporate Actor. 2007/3.  
155.  Martin Hellwig, A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation. 2007/2. 
154.  Christoph Engel, Competition in a Pure World of Internet Telephony. 2007/1. 
 
Preprints 2006 
153.  Christoph Engel, How Much Collusion. A Meta-Analysis On Oligopoly Experiments. 2006/27. 
152.  Martin Hellwig, Incentive Provision with Hidden Characteristics: A Unified Approach. 2006/26. 
151.  Martin Beckenkamp, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric  
Prisoner‘s Dilemma Games. 2006/25. 
150.  Felix Bierbrauer, Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems. 2006/24. 
149.  Sven Fischer / Andreas Nicklisch, Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision. 2006/23. 
forthcoming in:  
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 2007. 
148.  Martin Hellwig, Private Damage Claims and the Passing-On Defense in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases: An Economist’s 
Perspective. 2006/22.  
forthcoming in: 
Jürgen Basedow (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2007. 
147.  Martin Hellwig, The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling. 
2006/21. 
forthcoming in:  
Journal of Public Economics 
146.  Martin Hellwig, Effizienz oder Wettbewerbsfreiheit? Zur normativen Grundlegung der Wettbewerbspolitik. 2006/20.  
published in:  
Christoph Engel/Wernhard Möschel (eds.): Recht und spontane Ordnung. Festschrift für  
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker zum 80. Geburtstag. Nomos-Verlag Baden-Baden 2006, 231-268. 
145.  Christoph Engel / Elke U. Weber, The Impact of Institutions on the Decision How to Decide. 2006/19. 
144.  Felix Bierbrauer / Marco Sahm, Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule. 2006/18. 
143.  Andreas Nicklisch. Perceiving strategic environments: An experimental study of learning under minimal information. 
2006/17. 
142.  Felix Höffler: Mobile termination and collusion, revisited. 2006/16. 
141.  Ingolf Schwarz: Monetary Equilibria in a Baumol-Tobin Economy. 2006/15. 
140.  Martin Beckenkamp: The herd moves? Emergence and self-organization in collective actors. 2006/14.   26
139.  Christoph Engel: Herrschaftsausübung bei offener Wirklichkeitsdefinition. Das Proprium des Rechts aus der Perspektive 
des öffentlichen Rechts. 2006/13.  
forthcoming in:  
Christoph Engel/Wolfgang Schön: Das Proprium der Rechtswissenschaft. Mohr (Siebeck) Tübingen 2007. 
138.  Christoph Engel: Wettbewerb als sozial erwünschtes Dilemma. 2006/12.  
published in:  
Christoph Engel/Wernhard Möschel (eds.): Recht und spontane Ordnung. Festschrift für Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker 
zum 80. Geburtstag. Nomos-Verlag Baden-Baden 2006, , 155-198. 
137.  Hendrik Hakenes / Isabel Schnabel: The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks? 2006/11. 
136.  Martin Hellwig: Zur Kategorie der Kausalität in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften. 2006/10. 
135.  Felix Höffler / Madjid Kübler: Demand for storage of natural gas in northwestern Europe. A simulation based forecast 
2006-2030. 2006/9.  
134.  Dorothea Alewell / Andreas Nicklisch: Wage Differentials, Fairness and Social Comparison: An experimental study of the 
Co-Employment of Permanent and Temporary Agency Workers. 2006/8. 
133.  Stefan Magen, Zur Interaktion von Recht und sozialen Normen bei der dezentralen Bereitstellung von Gemeinschafts-
gütern. 2006/7. 
132.  Felix Bierbrauer, Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem. 2006/6. 
131.  Felix Höffler, Tobias Wittmann, Netting of capacity in interconnector auctions. 2006/5. 
130.  Eyal Ert / Andreas Nicklisch, Noisy commitments: The impact of information accuracy on efficiency. 2006/4. 
129.  Anne van Aaken, Begrenzte Rationalität und Paternalismusgefahr: Das Prinzip des schonendsten Paternalismus. 2006/3. 
forthcoming in:  
Christoph Engel/Markus Englerth/Jörn Lüdemann/Indra Spiecker: Recht und Verhalten. Mohr (Siebeck) Tübingen 
2007. 
128.  Jörn Lüdemann, Die Grenzen des homo oeconomicus und die Rechtswissenschaft. 2006/2. 
forthcoming in:  
Christoph Engel/Markus Englerth/Jörn Lüdemann/Indra Spiecker: Recht und Verhalten. Mohr (Siebeck) Tübingen 
2007. 
127.  Christoph Engel, The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law. 2006/1. 
 
 
 